Parmenides
By
Plato
Part I: Intro
Plato’s Parmenides Dialogue starts with Plato describing his return to Athens from home accompanied by Cephalus and meeting Plato’s brother Adeimantus in Agora, when Plato asks about their half-brother’s name and his whereabouts, to which Adeimantus replies ‘why’, and Plato tells him that some of his countrymen who were philosophy enthusiasts are interested to hear the recitation of Parmenides’s conversation with Socrates and Zeno which his half-brother Antiphon, a friend of Pythodorus, had recorded and studied carefully. Adeimantus then says ‘nothing easier’! But he also states that Antiphon is no longer persuing philosophy and has chosen a different direction in life, devoting himself entirely to breeding horses like his grandfather. So they all go to Melita where Antiphon was found giving a bridle to a smith to be fitted. When he was finished with his work they approached Antiphon and told him the purpose of their visit. Antiphon greets them and at first he is somewhat reluctant to repeat the dialogue to them but finally agrees to follow through.
Antiphon then describes the way they met Parmenides at the great Panathenaea where Antiphon and Zeno had lodged in the 'Ceramicus' outside the wall and where Socrates came to see them. Apparently Zeno had some writings of his own which he was reading to them in absence of Parmenides when, just before he was finished, Pythodorus, Parmenides and Aristotle enter.
When Zeno was done reading, Socrates asks him to read the first thesis of the first argument again, and once it was done Socrates asks Zeno what is his meaning when he maintains that ‘Being is Many’, and that it must be both ‘Like and Unlike’, for that type of assertion is an impossibility, because neither can the Like be Unlike, nor the Unlike Like; he then argues if we accept it to be both like and unlike then we can also argue for ‘Being is not Many’, or from another perspective ‘Not-Being is Many’ or ‘Not Being is not Many’ to be true.
Zeno then says: you have correctly understood my general purpose.
Then Socrates says:
I see, Parmenides, that Zeno would like to be not only one with you in friendship but your second self in his writings too; he puts what you say in another way, and would fain make believe that he is telling us something which is new. For you, in your poems, say ‘The All is One’, and of this you adduce excellent proofs; and he on the other hand says ‘There is No Many’; and on behalf of this he offers overwhelming evidence. You affirm Unity, he denies Plurality. And so you deceive the world into believing that you are saying different things when really you are saying much the same. This is a strain of art beyond the reach of most of us.
Zeno replies:
Yes, Socrates; but although you are as keen as a Spartan hound in pursuing the track, you do not fully apprehend the true motive of the composition, which is not really such an artificial work as you imagine; for what you speak of was an accident; there was no pretense of a great purpose; nor any serious intention of deceiving the world. The truth is, that these writings of mine were meant to protect the arguments of Parmenides against those who make fun of him and seek to show the many ridiculous and contradictory results which they supposed to follow from the affirmation of the one. My answer is addressed to the partisans of the many, whose attack I return with interest by retorting upon them that their hypothesis of the being of many, if carried out, appears to be still more ridiculous than the hypothesis of the being of one. Zeal for my master led me to write the book in the days of my youth, but some one stole the copy; and therefore I had no choice whether it should be published or not; the motive, however, of writing, was not the ambition of an elder man, but the pugnacity of a young one. This you do not seem to see, Socrates; though in other respects, as I was saying, your notion is a very just one.
Socrates still not content with the explanation tries to break down the arguments so that he can restart the argument from the foundation logic. But he introduces the word ‘Idea’ to address the words ‘Likeness’ and ‘Unlikeness’, which he then describes to be opposites of each other. Then he introduces another term ‘Participation’ right away by saying we ‘Apply’ the term ‘Many’ to ‘Things’ in which we all ‘Participate’. Then Socrates admits in a mixed participation scenario there could be ‘Things’ that are both like and unlike in the ‘Degree’ in which they ‘Participate’. In other words he doesn’t find that ideas of likeness or unlikeness to be necessarily conclusive and are dependent on the interpretation of the degree in which many things participate in those ideas. Therefore it is possible that ‘Many Things’ can ‘Partake’ of both likeness and unlikeness by reason of participation since in general they might have qualities which ‘Experience’ likeness and also qualities which experience unlikeness at the same time, and this would be nothing unusual, or of wonder. However, Socrates points out if a person could prove that ‘Absolute Like’ to become ‘Absolute Unlike’ or vise-versa then that would indeed be a ‘Wonder’.
Then Socrates goes on to say that the same applies to the ideas of ‘One’ and ‘Many’ and ‘Absolute One’ and ‘Absolute Many’. Next, Socrates gives us a hint by synonymously putting ‘Nature(s)’ and ‘Idea(s)’ in the same category or group.
Therefore now we can, generally speaking, substitute Absolute Nature (or Nature) for Absolute Idea (or Idea) and vise-versa in this dialogue where objectivity becomes a necessity; however as we shall see later in our analysis of Parmenides the meaning of the Idea and its relation to Nature, Being, and From is substantially different from the introductory sketch that Socrates, or rather Plato present to us. Parmenides also refers to this notion of perspective in philosophy near the end of this Dialogue and resembles it to a painting where the idea changes just as a painting changes due to the distance of the viewer from the painting. However, for now, and for the purpose of not confusing our readers in the very start with complexities, we advance naturally with the dialogue as the dialogue develops.
Then Socrates explains the difference between the two perceptions of ‘One’ and ‘Many’ where they could be interpreted by a person to be the same at the same time that they are different:
…But not if a person wanted to prove of me that I was many and also one. When he wanted to show that I was many he would say that I have a right and a left side, and a front and a back, and an upper and a lower half, for I cannot deny that I partake of multitude; when, on the other hand, he wants to prove that I am one, he will say, that we who are here assembled are seven, and that I am one and partake of the one. In both instances he proves his case. So, again, if a person shows that such things as wood, stones, and the like, being many are also one, we admit that he shows the coexistence of the one and many, but he does not show that the many are one or the one many; he is uttering not a paradox but a truism. If however, as I just now suggested, someone were to abstract simple notions of like, unlike, one, many, rest, motion, and similar ideas, and then to show that these admit of admixture and separation in themselves, I should be very much astonished. This part of the argument appears to be treated by you, Zeno, in a very spirited manner!
At this stage Plato says that Pythodorus noticed, Zeno and Parmenides although not very pleased with ‘Successive Steps’ of Socrates’ argument, were paying close attention to his words and often smiled in admiration of him, until he finished talking, and then Parmenides stepped in and said:
Socrates, I admire the bent of your mind towards philosophy; tell me now, was this your own distinction between ideas in themselves and the things which partake of them? And do you think that there is an idea of likeness apart from the likeness which we possess, and of the one and many, and of the other things which Zeno mentioned?
Socrates reiterates he believes there are two distinctive idea types. That is the objective and the subjective.
Then Parmenides, making sure that Socrates is talking about every notion of ‘Being’ having also an Absolute [Idea], asks Socrates to verify it, and he does.
Next he makes a humorous statement:
And would you make an idea of man apart from us and from all other human creatures, or of fire and water?
This is part philosophy, part realism, and part humor, because as we shall see later throughout the entire dialogue the way Parmenides displays his logic is Ice cold, and that is why we refer to him as The 'Iceman'. But that is just the way we see it due to its ostensible language which seems very clinical and methodical; apparently Parmenides had been teased with this type of attribute before and now he is bringing it forth with mentioning only fire and water of the four categories of primary elements in ancient philosophy, simply because when you heat ice it becomes water; and this is a humorous reference to Socrates’ 'youthful' nature of argument, perhaps as when he was younger in this dialogue, which was like fire, compared to Parmenides’ which was like ice.
Nevertheless, Socrates understanding the sublime nature of his statement returns the favor with another complementary, humorous, and sublime statement:
I am often undecided, Parmenides, as to whether I ought to include them or not!
But Parmenides doesn’t just stop there and now makes it more philosophical towards the unwanted elements and says:
And would you feel equally undecided, Socrates, about things of which the mention may provoke a smile?—I mean such things as hair, mud, dirt, or anything else which is vile and paltry; would you suppose that each of these has an idea distinct from the actual objects with which we come into contact, or not?
Here, he is referring to impurities and distractions which are often presented by those who are not of philosophical aptitude; perhaps like many of his students who wanted to become well known philosophers but did not have the right elements of thought and they were more of an annoyance and distraction than pleasure for him, and in a general sense for anyone, both for him and others who were not there to simply pass time and entertain themselves with endless sporadic arguments, but were there to seek advancement in their skills as thinkers.
And so, Socrates being very attentive and serious about the subject, and understanding what Parmenides is trying to get across, relieves him of any concern regarding this trivial matter and says:
Certainly not; visible things like these are such as they appear to us, and I am afraid that there would be an absurdity in assuming any idea of them, although I sometimes get disturbed, and begin to think that there is nothing without an idea; but then again, when I have taken up this position, I run away, because I am afraid that I may fall into a bottomless pit of nonsense, and perish; and so I return to the ideas of which I was just now speaking, and occupy myself with them.
By this Approach Socrates reveals he distinguishes between visible objects and non-visible ones. But he doesn’t get into any details, for he wants to see how Parmenides deals with the notions of visible and non-visible and whether in Parmenides’s method of argument he dismisses such distinctions.
Parmenides is a bit surprised but pretends he has not noticed Socrates’s distinction on visibility in the beginning of his reply and jumps back onto answering why he was feeling disturbed. He says:
Yes, Socrates, that is because you are still young; the time will come, if I am not mistaken, when philosophy will have a firmer grasp of you, and then you will not despise even the meanest things; at your age, you are too much disposed to regard the opinions of men. But I should like to know whether you mean that there are certain ideas of which all other things partake, and from which they derive their names; that similars, for example, become similar, because they partake of similarity; and great things become great, because they partake of greatness; and that just and beautiful things become just and beautiful, because they partake of justice and beauty?
Socrates agrees there is objectivity to ideas and perhaps particularity to names and titles of objects once they partake in an idea. Parmenides then divides the idea into two modes of participation: the whole and the part. Then he proceeds by asking: the whole idea is ‘one’ but since it has parts, [then] in each ‘one’ there is ‘many’?
Socrates says: why not?
Parmenides says:
Because one and the same thing will exist as a whole at the same time in many separate individuals, and will therefore be in a state of separation from itself.
So here, exist two categories of 'Idea':
One= Same -- thing (itself) = Whole
Many = Separate -- things (other) = Parts
One (whole) [plus] Many (parts) [therefore] = State of Separation from itself (One)
Socrates says:
Nay, but the idea may be like the day which is one and the same in many places at once and yet continuous with itself; in this way each idea may be one and the same in all at the same time.
By bringing the example of a great sail over the head of many individuals instead of the day, Parmenides demonstrates that this will make the idea both 'divisible' and 'one' at the same time. Yet Socrates disagrees. Then Parmenides brings the example of ‘Absolute Greatness’ and asks if it (the idea) could be divisible into portions, or if each equal ‘thing’ having a portion of equality less than ‘Absolute Equal’ be considered equal, or if a part of smallness which makes ‘Absolutely Small’ greater [in significance], and when added to it (the ideas) makes it smaller not greater [for losing its original degree of significance]?!
Socrates rejects the first two ideas of the ‘one’ and ‘many’ and finds the third one very absurd (paradoxical).
So Parmenides says:
Then in what way, Socrates, will all things participate in the ideas, if they are unable to participate in them either as parts or wholes?
Socrates replies:
Indeed you have asked a question which is not easily answered.
Then Parmenides asks another question during which he verifies Socrates’ previous general assertion that ‘Idea’ and ‘Nature’ are synonymous and interchangeable. However, he is content to leave it there, so he can expand on an example of the idea as Nature first; in this case the ‘Idea’ or ‘Nature’ of ‘Greatness’. Parmenides argues if great objects appear to be the same Idea or Nature, hence, at first, you conceive the 'Idea of Greatness' as one. But then other objects may appear that is not the Idea or Nature but raise the possibility of another 'Idea of Greatness' which in turn would seem to be the original source of greatness. This process continues over and above ‘Absolute Greatness’ with multiplication instead of being one Idea by virtue of which all these generations represent greatness and the individuals naturally will partake of it. In other words Parmenides is saying that an Idea can be applied to individual by individual but the individual cannot determine the Absolute Nature of it.
Here Parmenides replaces the Object with 'Individual' connecting between 'Idea' and 'Thought' which makes Socrates pop another question that is even more of a generalization and one that goes against the direction Parmenides was heading. He asks:
But may not the ideas, be thoughts only, and have no proper existence except in our minds, Parmenides? For in that case each idea may still be one, and not experience this infinite multiplication.
Parmenides brings Socrates back on track by saying that, thoughts are of ‘something’ which ‘is’, and they must be ultimately single in Form or Nature. So he also adds ‘Form’ to ‘Nature’ in ‘Unity’. Then he elaborates on this unity by saying: Something which is apprehended as One and the Same in all must be an Idea. Then he asks Socrates to define the function of thought in relation to everything and to itself since they are now considering that everything else (including thoughts which might not have a proper existence) participates in the Idea. Parmenides asks:
Then, if you say that everything else participates in the ideas, must you not say either, that everything is made up of thoughts, and that all things think, or that they are thoughts but have no thought?
Socrates replies:
The latter view, Parmenides, is no more rational than the previous one. In my opinion, the ideas are, as it were, patterns fixed in nature, and other things are like them and resemblances of them—what is meant by the participation of other things in the ideas, is really assimilation to them.
The Greek word used in Plato’s text for pattern is ‘Paradeigma’ (Paradigm, from Proto Indo European Deyk= to show, from Persian Par= before + Daxshakenitan= to show), and the word ‘Pattern’ or ‘Model’ would be its English equivalent. There is also another word in Greek protypo (προτυπο meaning archetype) in Greek consisting of two parts ‘pro’ and ‘typo’ which could have the same meaning. Therefore this translation to English, the word pattern, might not be the intended meaning by Socrates for it is more plausible to think that by the word ‘Paradigm’ or ‘Pattern’ or ‘Model’ Socrates means archetypal form, standard or general definition set by general characteristics which are archetypal. Further, the English word ‘Pattern’ could also imply plurality whereas ‘Paradigm’, ‘Model’ or ‘Protypo’ all exemplify either singularity or a unified generalization, both in meaning and appearance, and these differences are obvious from a linguistic standpoint. Therefore when Parmenides uses the word ‘Individual’ in place of the word ‘Object’ or ‘Thing’ which he was using previously, there might also be this connection of individuality that Socrates responds to when Parmenides was asking whether ‘all things think’ (as in individual) among other possibility.
It could also be that Socrates was comparing the Idea to Paradigm in ‘language structure’ which is defined as ‘a table of all the inflected forms of a particular verb, noun, or adjective, serving as a model for other words of the same conjugation or declension’ as described in Oxford dictionary.
To look at it from this perspective, the word Pattern in Old Iranian (Persian) languages is ‘Nikaar’ which comes from the word ‘Nikaas’. ‘Nikaas’ means perspective view of something and its other meanings and derivatives include sight, form, attention, protection (as in presiding over something), and preservation or maintenance of an idea; in a sense it is closer to Socrates’ description of ‘One’ as ‘Day’. In both Greek and Persian language the meaning of the word ‘Pattern’ leans more towards a preserved or protected framework or standard than the meaning in English language which leans more towards a series of repetitive and recognizable forms or a very general term like ‘Model’ instead. Therefore the meaning could get kind of fuzzy if we concentrate only on the English translation as in the single word ‘Pattern’. Eventually, however, it is up to the reader to decide what the intended form was; but we believe that the combination of the whole understanding of all these meanings makes the experience more comprehensive and the analysis more tangible since the Greeks and Persians not only shared the same early contextual linguistic derivations, namely of the Proto Indo European origins, but also the Persian language was probably the only language that had developed side by side or in parallel to the Greek language because of their historic rivalry in every aspect of civilization, civil life, or civil understanding of existence, as two competeing empires.
Further, Socrates characterizing participations as assimilations is in parallel to the philosophy, or as Parmenides later puts it, ‘Principle’ of synonyms like the Ideas of ‘Desire’ and ‘Preference’ which we discussed in other articles in Hegel series. So we can see when Parmenides substituted ‘Object’ by ‘Individual’, Socrates again went the other way and replaced ‘Participation’ by ‘Assimilation’.
It is also interesting to note that in the Old Iranian languages like Pahlavic the words ‘Assimilation’ and ‘Participation’ share a paradigm or are of inflected forms coming from the word ‘Saaz’ which means instrument (musical, or instrument of motivation or desire) and harmony (Antiphon’s name, Plato’s half-brother, also means harmony). The Persian word Saachishn (assimilation) is used to describe harmony, stability, and strength, while the word Pasaachishn (participation) is used to describe formation, combination, and correspondence. The word Pasaachishn is made of prefix ‘Pasaa’ and the word ‘Saachishn’. ‘Pasaa’ means ‘behind something’ (spatial) or ‘prior to something’ (temporal). Therefore in Iranian language the Idea, or noun, or action of participation precedes that of assimilation; that is why the word Saachisn also means something that has been already gone over many times to the point of fluency or certain ease in understanding or operation that it becomes an automatic preference or participation, hence ‘deserving’ in artificial sense (mechanical) or ‘second nature’ in a natural sense (human), depending on whether one looks upon it from a relative or inherent perspective.
There is a third word Masenishn (pairing or coupling) that comes from the word Mas (weight); here lies the idea of massiveness of the objects as they combine or assimilate to get smaller, to which Socrates humorously referred to as absurd! But it was actually a sample of Parmenides’ method that he was presenting to Socrates to sort of enlighten him on the extent to which this problem can go without notice.
Nevertheless, Parmenides skips over it for now to prepare Socrates for what he may or may not understand; so he’s testing waters at this stage but continues with expressing that he prefers the term 'Participation' and dismisses that resemblance is the mode in which ‘Things’ participate in Ideas. Parmenides says:
But if, the individual is like the idea, must not the idea also be like the individual, in so far as the individual is a resemblance of the idea? That which is like, cannot be conceived of as other than the like of like. And when two things are alike, must they not partake of the same idea? And will not that of which the two partake, and which makes them alike, be the idea itself? Then the idea cannot be like the individual or the individual like the idea; for if they are alike, some further idea of likeness will always be coming to light, and if that be like anything else, another; and new ideas will be always arising, if the idea resembles that which partakes of it? The theory, then, that other things participate in the ideas by resemblance, has to be given up, and some other mode of participation devised? Do you see then, Socrates, how great is the difficulty of affirming the ideas to be absolute?
Socrates agrees it is indeed reasonable to seek another mode or method of participation. Parmenides explains Socrates has so far only understood a small part of difficulty which is involved if you make each ‘Thing’ a single ‘Idea’, parting off from all others, and Socrates asks which difficulty?
Parmenides further explains when we say ‘Participation by Resemblance has to be given up’, we are actually giving our opponent a good reason to claim that our meaning, by such statement, which is naturally interpreted as sentiment considering the opponent’s lack of knowledge, is that the Ideas must remain unknown, and no one then can prove him wrong even if he is mistaken; and yet that indeed was not the case and Ideas could be known. Therefore, unless the one who argues against him has firstly, incredible skills in multitude of particular knowledge, and not without natural capacity, and secondly willing to follow proof through many long and elaborate details, he may succeed; but even then the one who now contends the Ideas are unknowable may still remain unconvinced.
The word used in dialogue for ‘Capacity’ is Aeolic word phue (φυης) or phuio (φυω) meaning ‘To Grow’ from Proto Indo European Buh (to become, grow) and Persian Budan or Butan (existence).
Socrates asks what he means. Parmenides now reminds Socrates that they both agree Absolute Essences, if one maintains they exist, they do not exist in us, for if they did they would no longer be absolute.
Now Parmenides declares there are two separate spheres or realms: one which belongs to Ideas and another which belongs to us, and they cannot be interchangeable, for each realm’s essences are determined in relation to each other and not by resemblances or attributes or names given by us when partaking of them. Yet, things which are within our sphere, and happen to bear the same names as the ones in the other realm, but likewise are only relative to each other, and not to the Ideas that have the same Names; therefore these names only belong to themselves not to them.
Socrates asks: what does he mean?
Parmenides says: 'such as the idea of a ‘Master’ and a ‘Slave’. In essence, a slave is not a slave of the Essence of the master and vise-versa, because these essences are Absolute Ideas and do not relate to our realm, whereas when being in the human sphere they share such relation. On the other hand mastership itself is what it is, and in relation the same with enslavement itself by nature. Therefore the relationships in us in no way correspond to the relationships by those Ideas in their own realm. Thus, they both (master and slave) have relations by themselves and with themselves, while we have in similar way relations by those ‘Titles’ in our sphere'.
That is true because in the virtual realm (perfect realm/ External) the ideal of the master and the ideal of the slave and their relations are different from the real realm (imperfect realm/Internal/our realm) where their relations are based on superficial human understandings of such relations because of the problem of multiplicity addressed by Parmenides before, and superficial understanding of knowledge and its nature, and lack of knowledge about being in both realms.
That is why Parmenides says:
And will not knowledge—I mean absolute knowledge—answer to absolute truth? And each kind of absolute knowledge will answer to each kind of absolute being? But the knowledge which we have, will answer to the truth which we have; and again, each kind of knowledge which we have, will be a knowledge of each kind of being which we have. But the ideas themselves, as you admit, we have not, and cannot have. And the absolute natures or kinds are known severally by the absolute idea of knowledge. And we have not got the idea of knowledge. Then none of the ideas are known to us, because we have no share in absolute knowledge. Then the nature of the beautiful in itself, and of the good in itself, and all other ideas which we suppose to exist absolutely, are unknown to us.
The word used in this Dialogue for ‘having’ or ‘possessing’, in Greek, is ‘Ekomen’ (εχομεν) coming from the word ‘Eko’ with the Proto Indo European root ‘Seg’ and Persian ‘Hasaagazht’ or ‘Hastaagasht’ (Hastaa=Possession, Gasht=turn/return) related to Old Persian word Hastikih which means being, truth, permanence or continuity. Therefore what Parmenides is emphasizing regarding ‘having knowledge’ is mostly along this line of reasoning and thought.
Socrates agrees with all that Parmenides has to say about both realms and how in different ways we try to adjust our knowledge to the truth of Absolute Knowledge or to the truth of Absolute Idea of Knowledge in vain. In other words the ‘External Realm’ has nothing directly to do with the ‘Internal Realm’ since they are of different nature and therefore have different truths. And each mentioned realm, External and Internal, also has an internal and external side.
Parmenides further emphasizes that there is still a stranger (more paradoxical / difficult) consequence. The word Deynoteron (δεινοτερον) used in dialogue for ‘strange’ or ‘fearful’ has several meanings in Greek language ranging from terrible and powerful, to strange, and timid. But the Proto Indo European word ‘Dwey’, and Persian word ‘Dwayshti’, coming from the infinitive ‘Dwaristan’ (running in great speed, normally used for describing evil or satanic creatures) which seems to be a bit more theatric, is most likely the intended meaning.
Then Parmenides presents the problem he finds most disturbing:
Would you, or would you not say, that absolute knowledge, if there is such a thing, must be a far more exact knowledge than our knowledge; and the same of beauty and of the rest? And if there be such a thing as participation in absolute knowledge, no one is more likely than God to have this most exact knowledge? But then, will God, having absolute knowledge, have a knowledge of human things?
Socrates says: why not?
Parmenides says:
Because, Socrates, we have admitted that the ideas are not valid in relation to human things; nor human things in relation to them; the relations of either are limited to their respective spheres. And if God has this perfect authority, and perfect knowledge, his authority cannot rule us, nor his knowledge know us, or any human thing; just as our authority does not extend to the gods, nor our knowledge know anything which is divine, so by parity of reason they, being gods, are not our masters, neither do they know the things of men.
The word Akribestatin (ακριβεστατην) used in dialogue for ‘Perfect’ comes from the Greek word AkrisBenai (Akris=mountain top, Benai=walk) or AkribesEibo (Akros=sharp + Eibo=drop), and Proto Indo European word ‘Hekros’ which in Persian has the form of 'Hixtar' (pulling up) attached to an infinitive form 'Buxtitan' (rescue / salvation), hence HixtarBuxtitan.
And the word Despoteia (δεσποτεια) used in dialogue for ‘Authority’ or ‘Despotism’ coming from Doric ‘Despotas’ or from ‘Despotes’ (master) and from Proto Indo European Demspotis (Doms=House, Potis=Master) or Persian Daamak Pattukih (creator powerful).
Socrates says:
Yet, surely to deprive God of knowledge is monstrous.
The word Thavmastos (θαυμαστος) used in dialogue for 'Monstrous' means ‘Astonishment’; in Persian the word Tamaxv (nature of darkness) is close to that meaning; so Thavmastos in combination with Ionic word λιαν (lian) ‘Epic’, makes the phrase ‘Epic Astonishment’ or in the translation ‘Monstrous’.
Parmenides says:
These, Socrates, are a few, and only a few of the difficulties in which we are involved if ideas really are and we determine each one of them to be an absolute unity. He who hears what may be said against them will deny the very existence of them—and even if they do exist, he will say that they must of necessity be unknown to man; and he will seem to have reason on his side, and as we were remarking just now, will be very difficult to convince; a man must be gifted with very considerable ability before he can learn that everything has a class and an absolute essence; and still more remarkable will he be who discovers all these things for himself, and having thoroughly investigated them is able to teach them to others.
The word Genus (γενος) used in dialogue for ‘Class’ Proto Indo European 'Genhi' (to produce, give birth) and from Persian word Jaan or Gyaan (life). It is important to note that the word Genesis comes from Persian Jaan/Gyaan. As most people familiar with the Bible know, Genesis is also the name of a book or chapter in the Bible.
Further, as we will see progressing through the Parmenides Dialogue and other Dialogues, and the approach taken by Plato towards philosophy to let Ideas reveal themselves by time, we could certainly consider Parmenides Dialogue's relation to the rest of Plato's Dialogues to be comparable to the relation of the Book of Genesis to the Bible in terms of both being a symbol of Introduction to Dialogues and involving some undeniably fundamnetal Principles of Plato's philosophy.
Socrates says:
I agree with you, Parmenides, and what you say is very much to my mind.
Parmenides says:
And yet, Socrates, if a man, fixing his attention on these and the like difficulties, does away with ideas of things and will not admit that every individual thing has its own determinate idea which is always one and the same, he will have nothing on which his mind can rest; and so he will utterly destroy the power of reasoning, as you seem to me to have particularly noted… But, then, what is to become of philosophy? Whither shall we turn, if the ideas are unknown?
Socrates says:
I certainly do not see my way at present.
At this moment Parmenides feels that Socrates is no longer challenging or interfering with his or Zeno’s approach and is paying more attention to what he has to say. He finds Socrates to be at ease with himself even as he criticizes Socrates for his deficiencies as a student of philosophy, but he also complements his vigor and enthusiasm by saying:
The impulse that carries you towards philosophy is assuredly noble and divine!
The word Ormas (ορμας) used in dialogue for ‘Impulse’ comes from Greek word Horme/Ormi (force) or Eiro (to bind) Proto Indo European Ser (to bind), Persian 'Serishn' (bind), 'Seer' or 'Sagr' (full, Saturated, or drenched) or the Persian word Urmazd (All Knowing God).
Then he continues:
But there is an art which is called by the vulgar idle talking, and which is often imagined to be useless; in that you must train and exercise yourself, now that you are young, or truth will elude your grasp!
Parmenides advises Socrates to practice a certain philosophical way of ‘Idle Talking’ which the majority of people consider to be of no use. The word Adoleschias (αδολεσχιας) used in dialogue for ‘Idle Talking’ is perhaps from Adolos (αδολος=plain) and εστιας or istos (ιστοσ=web) Proto Indo European 'Histemi' (Mast, Beam, or Web) and in Persian Istaa (upright); the Persian word Adooshishnih or Adoostih (unfriendly) which could also mean ‘undesirable’, and the word Doosh Huxt (undesirable talk) or Doosh-Ivaachih (vulgar talk). So the word Addostih-Ivaachih can be derived from the former word, and latter phrase, which means ‘Unfriendly Talk’; the Persian word Dawaal (deceptive, crafty; particularly in speech) in combination with the word Istaa (upright) mentioned above would be the phrase Dawaal-e-Istaa ([useless] talkative post) and if we add the negative ‘A’ (‘A’ privative) as prefix Adawaali-e-Istaa is also near this meaning where the adjective Dawaal has turned into a verb (perhaps other adverb/adjective forms Dawaalanah/Dawaalanih could also be created in this manner) and where a negative word by adding a privative becomes positive!
Socrates eager to hear what Parmenides’ method is asks:
And what is the nature of this exercise, Parmenides, which you would recommend?
The word used in dialogue for 'Exercise' is gymnasias (γυμνασιας) from Greek Gymnos or Gumnos (naked) from Proto Indo European word Neg (naked) or Iranian Nok or Nog (new/fresh).
First Parmenides expresses the fact that he was pleased with this notion that Socrates did not care much about visible rather seeks to understand the mental aspect of Objects and Ideas which is in mind. And Socrates says that indeed by this method it can be shown beings experience both the 'Like' and the 'Unlike' and anything else that exists! Parmenides agrees, but he says it is still better if one goes a step further and considers the consequences which follow when hypothesizing that a particular Idea 'Exists' or when an Idea 'Does not Exist'. Socrates asks how?
Parmenides explains:
(1) If 'Many' exist what would result to 'Many Selves' in relation to 'Selves' and in relation to the 'One', and if 'Many' exist what would be the result for the 'One' in relation to 'Self' and in relation to 'Many'. And in turn if 'Many' don’t exist what will result in relation to 'One' and 'Many' and in relation to 'Selves' and 'Each Other' be.
(2) If 'Likeness' exists or doesn’t exist what will be the result to the 'Selves' hypothesized and to 'Other's, both in relation to 'Selves' and to 'Each Other'.
(3) The same method must also be applied to the 'Unlike', 'Motion' and 'Rest', 'Generation' and 'Destruction, and to 'Existence' (being) and 'Non-Existence' (Not Being) of 'Self'. And in one mode concerning the object that should be hypothesized as 'Always-Being' and as 'Not-Being' and anything else that undergoes any 'Experience' whatsoever, those consequences should be considered in relation to 'Self' and in relation to 'Each one of the Others' being considered that anyone may setup for this purpose, and in relation to 'Many', and similarly in relation to 'Everything'.
(4) How the 'Others' are related to 'Selves' and to any 'Other' which one might select, whether you hypothesize as the subject of hypothesis, that, which Always 'IS', or as 'Non-Being'.
Although the language that Parmenides uses to expand on his 'Philosophy of Ideas' regarding the example of 'One' and 'Many' is simple in appearance, Socrates finds it to be very difficult; he says:
That, Parmenides, is a tremendous business of which you speak, and I do not quite understand you; will you take some hypothesis and go through the steps?—then I shall apprehend you better.
The word Amichanon (αμηχανον) used in Dialogue and translated into English as ‘Extraordinary’ or ‘Tremendous’ in the recited text, is perhaps alpha privative form of the word michanos (μηχανος) or michano (μηχανο) or mechani (μηχανη) meaning engineer or engine or machine, with the addition of α as prefix means unworkable or unimaginable, and comes from Doric Machana (μαχανα), or possibly from Proto Indo European Meg (to be able), and similar to Persian word Mazan (powerhouse) or Mahist or Mahast (something of great significance) as in the phrase Mahist Akasih (greatest knowledge); therefore it means 'Impossible' or 'Meaningless' in Persian.
The word Pragmateian (πραγματειαν) used in dialogue for ‘business’ means discourse, from Pragma (πραγμα) and Proto Indo European Prhkyeti or Perh (to go over) with the same meaning for the Persian prefix Pira- as in the word Piramun (boundry) and prefix Fra- (after, before, limit) and the verb Frakanenitan (to initiate, to establish, to lay foundations for a work).
Parmenides replies:
That, Socrates, is a serious task to impose on a man of my years.
Socrates then asks Zeno to fulfill the task; but Zeno seems to find himself inferior to his master Parmenides, then smiles and replies:
Let us make our petition to Parmenides himself, who is quite right in saying that you are hardly aware of the extent of the task which you are imposing on him; and if there were more of us I should not ask him, for these are not subjects which any one, especially at his age, can well speak of before a large audience; most people are not aware that this roundabout progress through all things is the only way in which the mind can attain truth and wisdom. And therefore, Parmenides, I join in the request of Socrates, that I may hear the process again which I have not heard for a long time.
The word Diexodou (διεξ οδου) used in dialogue for ‘roundabout progress’ is made of two parts, first, the word Diex (split) coming from Dia (δια=through) and from Greek root διςα and Proto Indo European Dwoh (two) and Persian Tihak (edge) and Do (two).
Similarly the Persian word Duz or Duzh has two meanings ‘diagonal’ and ‘thief’.
Duz is also the name for the rather ancient and popular game known today as Tic-Tac-Toe or X-O.
Also the word Odou (threshold, path, and method) from Homeric (reffering to his work Odyssey) word ουδος (oudos) and from Proto Indo European Sodos, and from the word Sed (to sit) and from Persian Setush (SE=Three, Tush=Night) or abbriviated Stush (trial and ordeal of the first three nights after death, or the mortal end, which is to be endured or sustained by the dead in ancient Iranian religion of Mazdayasna otherwise known as Zoroastrian).
Here Parmenides,without reffering to Homer directly, also refutes that his 'voyage' is like Homer’s Odysseus and rather he ‘feels’ more like Ibycus!!
Parmenides said:
I cannot refuse, and yet I feel rather like Ibycus, who, when in his old age, against his will, he fell in love, compared himself to an old racehorse, who was about to run in a chariot race, shaking with fear at the course he knew so well—this was his simile of himself. And I also experience a trembling when I remember through what an ocean of words I have to wade at my time of life.
A Poem by German poet and philosopher Schiller about Ibycus with the Title 'Die Kraniche des Ibykus' (Cranes of Ibycus) might be considered a reaction to Parmenides’ poetic description of himself in Plato’s Dialogue:
Und, wie im Meere Well auf Well,
So läufts von Mund zu Munde schnell:
‘Des Ibykus, den wir beweinen,
Den eine Mörderhand erschlug!’
And as in the sea wave by wave,
There it goes mouth by mouth rapidly:
'The Ibycus, who we weep for,
Who one murderous hand killed!’
The German word Kraniche (or Kranich, Kran) and Greek word Geranos (γερανος) come from Proto Indo European word Gerh (to cry hoarsely) from Persian Grih (to cry). Also, Crane used in the poem is of symbolic nature. Ironically, particularly In the Far Eastern cultures (Asia) this symbol signifies good fortune and longevity. It is also a constellation in the southern hemisphere. In industrial work it is well known that a Crane is a compound structural mechanism that lifts heavy objects vertically that can also move these objects in horizontal rotation, usually used for construction or loading. As we will find out later this is a reference to the Vertical (Form(s) = the two Egos: Metaphysics (perferct/virtual) and Ego (imperfect/real)) and Horizontal (Non-Forms(s) = the Horizons: Nature and Being) aspects of mind described in Quran as 'Egos' and 'Horizons' and by Parmenides as principles of Form, Nature, and Being.
Therefore Schiller appears to have a different yet similar view of Parmenides's Ibycus with the simile of a Crane instead of an old racehorse.
Parmenides then continues:
But I must indulge you, as Zeno says that I ought, and we are alone. Where shall I begin? And what shall be our first hypothesis, if I am to attempt this laborious pastime? Shall I begin with myself, and take my own hypothesis the one? And consider the consequences which follow on the supposition either of the being or of the not-being of one?
Then Zeno says: by all means!
The words used in dialogue for the phrase ‘by all means’ are πανυ (pany=all) μεν (men=accordingly) ουν (oun=then). In English translation the word ‘all’ naturally is placed between 'by’ and ‘means’, whereas in Greek phrase it comes first; so it reads 'all accordingly then’. Therefore the word μεν (accordingly) is used in dialogue for ‘means’ coming from Proto Indo European Sme or Me (middle), from Persian Meed (center) and from the word Mayaan, possibly coming from the ancient Iranian word May (wine) or Maydaan (center square, battlefield, or an area of operation as in any field, subject, discipline, or skill).
And who will answer me? he said. Shall I propose the youngest? He will not make difficulties and will be the most likely to say what he thinks; and his answers will give me time to breathe.
The word anapavla (αναπαυλα) used in dialogue meaning ‘rest’ or ‘breather’ which could also mean a military truce (a regular practice in ancient times for gathering the dead, resting, and recovering/ recuperating for both sides) comes from Persian Paav (cleansing) and Laay (mud/dirt from word Layan or Lajan=sludge).
At this point Aristotle volunteers to answer Parmenides and Parmenides starts with his method by first hypothesis:
If one is, the one cannot be many.
End of Part I
Image Source: wikimedia
Sources:
1- The Dialogues of Plato Translated by Jowett
2- Plato Parmenides Translated by Balboa and Grimes
3- wiktionary
4- Persian-Pahlavic Dictionary by Faravashi